Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Jan Lindemann	f70cc48eb6	lib.ec.secret_store.TarGpg: Add the write path ... The TarGpg store is read-only: put() and unlink() raise, so the store can be copied from, but not into, and a copy that lands entries and blobs below a host prefix has no tarball target. This matches the way jw-pkg secrets has worked for a long time. Since Stores are now FileContext-backed, a write path can be cleanly implemented, and that's what this commit does. A put rebuilds the tarball: the existing members minus the removed, plus the written one; the result is signed with the recipient from JW_SECRETS_TARGPG_RECIPIENT and written back to the tarball location, which must be a local path. A missing tarball is an empty store, so a put creates it. The put dispatch follows the other stores: a typed entry put replaces the entry with the given serialized content, a key put merges into its entry, creating it if it does not exist yet, and an untyped put below an entry lands a key there, otherwise a blob. unlink() removes the node's member. Signed-off-by: Jan Lindemann <jan@janware.com> Assisted-by: unsloth/Qwen3.8-27B-GGUF:Q4_K_M with pi.dev v1.1.0	2026-10-17 13:09:45 +02:00
Jan Lindemann	f08f658d33	lib.ec.secret_store: Add and use framework ... "jw-pkg secrets install" copies secret material from a GPG-encrypted tar archive to dotenv .jw-secret files on a target host. This commit refactors the underlying code and adds hooks for the inverse copy direction, and for more secret sources and targets. The peers between which secrets are copied are represented by the new abstract secret_store.Base class, and the existing tar blob and host storages, inheriting from that class, are TarGpg and KvFile. Moreover, secret_store.Base is inheriting from FileContext, so all of jw-pkg's file-like operations are available as hooks. Secrets inside instances of two file contexts are addressable as (targpg|kvfile)://target.host.com/path/to/file.conf.jw-secret. The on-host KvFile will look either locally or via SSH for that file, and TarGpg will look inside a tar archive specified in the JW_SECRETS_TARGPG_TAR environment variable. Uris with these schemas can be passed to FileContext.create(), which will return a chrooted file context of the correct type. KvFile.stat("/path/to/file.conf.jw-secret").ftype is FT_SECRET which inherits from FT_COMPOUND - which means that readdir() works on such animals. Not entirely sure if that's a good idea, but it feels pretty generic. Let's see where that takes us. DistroContext.install() after this refactor reads its source through the store interface and writes the landing through the KvFile store. Both secret stores are exercised through the existing unit test of jw-pkg secrets install, and unit tests for both stores are also added by this commit. Signed-off-by: Jan Lindemann <jan@janware.com>	2026-10-17 12:52:20 +02:00
Jan Lindemann	0c732672ed	lib.FileContext: Add readdir() method ... FileContext offers get(), put(), unlink(), mkdir(), and stat(), but no way to list the entries of a directory, so consumers that need the names of the entries under a path in a context have no portable means to obtain them. Add readdir(), returning Iterable[str], following the _readdir() -> readdir() pattern used by the other operations: the public method chroots the path via _chroot() and delegates to the _readdir() hook, which raises NotImplementedError by default. Implement _readdir() in the context families: - Local._readdir(): os.listdir() - ExecContext._readdir(): runs ls -1A and splits the output into one entry per line; inherited by SSHClient and the other command-based contexts - Curl._readdir(): raises OSError with errno.ENOSYS Add unit tests covering Local (listing, hidden entries, missing directory) and Curl (ENOSYS). Assisted-by: unsloth/Qwen3.8-27B-GGUF:Q4_K_M with pi.dev v0.87.1 Signed-off-by: Jan Lindemann <jan@janware.com>	2026-09-29 15:29:19 +02:00
Jan Lindemann	dc101a5a7f	lib.ec.ssh.Exec: Fix askpass script ... __init_askpass() embeds the password verbatim in a generated bash script, with a newline included inside the double quotes of the echo -n. The askpass program therefore always appends a newline to the password, and any password containing quotes or shell metacharacters either breaks the script or injects commands into it. Embed the password as base64 and decode it with printf piped into base64 -d, so the script is safe for any password and prints the password exactly, byte for byte. Make __del__() idempotent: it deletes the environment variables and the script file, so a second call, e.g. an explicit one followed by garbage collection, raises KeyError and FileNotFoundError. Add a unit test that executes the generated script and compares its output with the password byte for byte. Signed-off-by: Jan Lindemann <jan@janware.com> Assisted-by: unsloth/Qwen3.8-27B-GGUF:Q4_K_M with pi.dev v0.85.1	2026-09-14 20:32:14 +02:00